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Musical Pasts and Postmodern Musicologies: 
A Response to Lawrence Kramer 
By Gary Tomlinson 
Early last summer, not long after I was invited by the editors of Current 
Musicology to contribute to this special issue, the inaugural issue of an-
other music journal landed in my mail box. This was repercussions, pro-
duced by graduate students at the University of California at Berkeley. It 
opened with a position piece by Lawrence Kramer entitled 'The Musicol-
ogy of the Future"-a fitting beginning, given that the journal is devoted 
to fostering "critical & alternative viewpoints on music and scholarship" 
and that Kramer has ·emerged over the past decade as one of the shrewd-
est and most theoretically savvy of a younger generation of musical schol-
ars. But Kramer's essay, on closer inspection, was disconcerting. 'The Mu-
sicology of the Future" seems to me to linger over old viewpoints more 
than suggest new ones. It reveals patterns of thought that not only already 
threaten to harden into new orthodoxies of postmodern musicology but 
that have, at the deepest level, moved little from the putative truths they 
aim to leave behind. What follows is a brief rejoinder to Kramer's vision of 
the new musicology. 
I should say at the beginning that I do not think Kramer is alone in his 
difficulty in escaping the old orthodoxies; if he were, my differences with 
his approach would have no broader resonance than that of a personal 
disagreement. I sense, instead, that all of us who work in the methodologi-
cal realms he calls postmodern have experienced this difficulty, that we 
have all felt twinges of an unease that originates in our sense of the 
persistent proximity of our methods to those we thought we had moved 
away from. We have met the enemy and they is us. Kramer's (and our) 
difficulty touches the heart of our conceptions of the new musicology. For 
this reason it seems to me that a brief description of some methodological 
choices that (in my view) underlie his essay and a sketch of some alterna-
tive choices might help move the discussion forward. 
*** 
Kramer rightly locates the origins of what we may call modernist musi-
cology in nineteenth-century views of the signifying distance between mu-
sic and words (pp. 7-8). Because of this gap, language was closed off from 
music; words were "denied access" to its transcendent expressive modes. 
Those who sought to put the study of music on a scholarly footing were 
left with two options: positivistic description of historical data around the 
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music and analytic description of the workings of the notes themselves. In 
the first option the experience itself of music was separated off entirely 
from the scholarly endeavor, while in the second it was transformed, its 
quasi-religious transcendence sublimated in technical accounts of musical 
process. Neither option challenged the autonomy and "epistemologically 
self-contained" character of the musical experience. 
But, Kramer notes, this maintenance of music's autonomy does not jibe 
with the worldliness and contextual contingency that postmodern scholars 
find in all utterance, musical or otherwise (p. 9). Therefore, "from a 
postmodern perspective, music as it has been conceived of by musicology 
simply does not exist." In order to reconceive music (and musicology) in 
postmodern terms we need not, however, reject the immediacy of its ef-
fects on us (p. 10); Kramer would not "show [his] love for music by 
ceasing to e~oy it." Instead we should abandon the myth of music's au-
tonomy by broadening "the horizons of our musical pleasure" and wel-
coming the complex situatedness of musical utterances in webs of 
extramusical forces. 
So far, so good. Kramer's diagnosis of the constraints enacted in mod-
ernist musicology is smart and eloquent, and his general recommenda-
tions are headed in the right direction: toward a new, more flexible 
contextualization of music and its histories. But in filling out the details of 
these recommendations Kramer begins to reveal the tenacity of modernist 
ideology in the new musicology. 
Kramer betrays this modernism already when he dubs "criticism" the 
"rhetorical" and "subjective" language by which we might contextualize 
music (p. 9). This term, as I have suggested elsewhere, seems in all its 
many meanings destined to put an ahistorical, aestheticist, sometimes even 
formalist spin on what might otherwise be conceived as our rich historical 
encounter of others' musical utterances (see "The Web of Culture: A 
Context for Musicology," 19th-Century Music 7 [1984]: 350-62). The evoca-
tion of criticism, in other words, tends to deal out from the start the most 
essential and richly problematic historicism of our experiences, musical 
and other. More on this historicism below. 
Kramer reveals his modernism more fundamentally in his next move 
(pp. 10-11). He locates the context of music-"the densely compacted, 
concretely situated worlds of those who compose, perform, and listen" 
that he sees as basic to postmodern perceptions-in the music itself. "The 
emergence of a postmodernist ... musicology," he writes, ''will depend on 
our willingness and ability to read as inscribed within the immediacy-effects 
of music itself the kind of mediating structures usually positioned outside 
music under the rubric of context.".or again, countering Charles Rosen's 
reading of Mozart's Divertimento K. 563: ''What if the music were heard, 
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not as the site where its contexts vanish, but precisely as the site where 
they appear?" Kramer's own example of an alternative musicology-his 
discussion of the special physicality he hears in K 563 (pp. 11-16)-
follows from this question. 
This is for me a troubling maneuver. Its effect is to sweep away in a 
single stroke the epistemological and phenomenological quandaries at-
tendant on the contextualization Kramer has just finished advocating. The 
many opportunities presented by such thick contextualism are likewise 
lost, leaving little more than an internalist engagement of the critic with 
the work. Indeed Kramer unreservedly identifies the "work" as the locus of 
the new musicology, even though it is one of the modernist categories 
contested most rewardingly in postmodern thought. In the very moment 
that he holds out hope for an extramusical broadening of the notes' 
signifying potential, he draws our attention back to the work, making it 
the primary (almost exclusive) matrix of its own meanings. Ultimately, I 
believe, he substitutes modernist internalism and aestheticism, both carry-
ing still the potent charge of nineteenth-century transcendentalism, for 
postmodern contingency and localism. 
In this sleight""Df-hand that decontextualizes his contextualism, Kramer 
falls back on a central tenet of modernist musicology: the sweeping subjec-
tive powers of the composer to speak to the critic (analyst, listener in 
general) through the music. This retrenchment is evident in the example 
Kramer offers, where Mozart is repeatedly seen to be complicit in 
"foregrounding" the particular corporeality Kramer senses in K 563. If we 
are skeptical, if we wonder where Mozart's music has disappeared to in the 
questions Kramer asks, we are assured that Mozart himself raises these 
questions "by making his music behave as it does, and trusting the listener 
to hear the music within a broader field of rhetorical, expressive, and 
discursive behaviors." The critic and the composer are perfectly attuned 
here, speaking to one another without difficulty through the music. Mozart's 
trust, it would seem, is well placed. 
In reading this passage, I for one do not find myself wondering where 
K 563 has gone. Mozart's music is simply with us, in one or another of its 
numberless performative realities, at any moment that we might choose to 
make it so, and serious thought about music, modernist and postmodern, 
has always been needlessly plagued by those who exaggerate the fragility 
of our cultural icons. I wonder, instead, where Mozart has gone-Mozart, a 
mysterious and elusive subjectivity whom (as Hildesheimer, Solomon, even 
perhaps Amadeus have begun to show us) we too easily come to believe we 
know well. Kramer evades the immense complexity of the historian's dia-
logue with past subjectivities. He offers as the goal of musicology the 
continuance of "the dialogue of listening," but he gives little hint as to 
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how we might begin to reconceive this dialogue in postmodern terms. 
Indeed, from his example we could only guess that his "dialogue" comes 
closer to modernist solipsism than to true conversation-to a ventriloquist's 
monologue in which the critic reacts to the music by throwing his/her 
voice into the body of the faintly imagined composer/other. It is, finally, 
Kramer's confidence in his bond with Mozart that rankles here. The invio-
late security of his knowledge speaks the language of an older musicology. 
Instead of postmodern doubt, play, and problematizing of the communi-
cative relation, Kramer offers a too-familiar modernist mastery. 
*** 
If all this may seem a rather harsh reaction to an essay whose most 
general anti-modernist intent I certainly applaud, I should repeat by way 
of melioration what I said at the outset: Kramer's difficulties seem to me 
to be emblematic of a more general methodological conundrum, of the 
struggles of a growing number of scholars to forge a musicology genuinely 
distanced from modernist premises. We are, all of us, in this mess to-
gether, notwithstanding the individual differences of method and empha-
sis that distinguish an Abbate from a Feld, a McClary from an Agawu, a 
Bianconi from a Subotnik. 
The struggle should not discourage the endeavor, of course. It reflects 
in part the inevitable persistence of well-molded patterns of thought, of 
disciplinary premises and practices that will only gradually erode. More 
fundamentally, it reflects the contestatory and self-problematizing stance 
of postmodernism itself in the face of modernism, a stance that will (we 
may hope) increasingly decenter and destabilize postmodern musicologi-
cal discourse even as the nature of this discourse grows clearer. In broad 
terms, a postmodern musicology will be characterized most distinctively by 
its insistent questioning of its own methods and practices. 
This self-questioning might arise in many areas of our thought. I will 
suggest four such areas that seem to be, at most, little evident in Kramer's 
view of the new musicology. These are interrelated places where we might 
envision musicological premises different from those of modernism or at 
least find a productive and clarifying tension between those older pre-
sumptions and postmodern ones. They are topoi, in other words, that 
might help to inch us past the gravitational pull of modernist method. 
First, we might seek alternatives to the internalism and formalism that 
have dominated musicology. This is ostensibly Kramer's primary goal. But 
his insistence on close reading of the notes and his locating of context in 
them undoes his good intentions. I would go farther than Kramer here 
and suggest that we need to move away from the whole constraining 
notion that close reading of works of music, of whatever sort, is the sine 
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qua non of musicological practice. This notion has repeatedly pulled us 
back toward the aestheticism and transcendentalism of earlier ideologies. 
(I have felt the pull in much of the nascent postmodern musicology 1 have 
read and written.) It is not enough to cast our close readings in the light 
of new methods-narratological, feminist, phenomenological, anthropo-
logical, whatever. For it is the act of close reading itsellf that carries with it 
the ideological charge of modernism. These new methods, instead, need 
to be linked to new approaches to music that have distanced themselves 
from such analytically oriented reading. They need, indeed, to be allowed 
to engender such new approaches. 
Finding alternatives to close reading without forgoing entirely the spe-
cific discussion of music they have habitually enabled is a ticklish task, as 
Kramer's attempt should warn us. Such alternatives might well emerge, 1 
think, from all three of the remaining topoi 1 will summarize below. But in 
the most general way 1 believe they will be discovered in a kind of 
contextualization different from Kramer's. This contextualism will not circle 
back narrowly to the notes but instead will resolutely historicize musical utter-
ance, exploding it outwards through an imaginative building of contexts 
out of as wealthy a concatenation of past traces as the historian can man-
age. Such contextualism will aim to describe a local set of meanings in as 
full a volume as possible. It will not pose as a reconstruction of some 
putative and unitary "original" situation the music inhabited but will rec-
ognize the myriad situations we as historians might construct around a 
musical utterance and the plurality of meanings the music might thus 
engage. This contextualism will be, like Foucault's archaeology/geneal-
ogy, Geertz's anthropology, or Ginzburg's or Chartier's history, a localiz-
ing rather than a universalizing strategy. And, in the act of its seeking out 
its own locale within a plurality of potential meanings, it will incorporate 
the very "rhetorical" and "subjective" character that Kramer sought in the 
old haunts of criticism. 
Second, we might become more sensitive to realms of musical 
culture-making beyond the ken of individual, subjective agency. Such agency 
maintains the modernist myths of genius and inspired, empowered, he-
roic individualism and supports the reflection of these myths in the omni-
scient critic (again Kramer's discussion of K 563 is a useful caution). We 
cannot successfully challenge these myths while we remain bound to mod-
els of culture that see it as made exclusively through the conscious and 
subconscious intents of historical actors. Neither can we do so while we 
adhere singlemindedly to conceptions of subjectivity that grant it unri-
valed culture-making powers. 
The different, metasubjective level of cultural formation that 1 have in 
mind moves beyond the reach of individual subjectivities even as they are 
GARY TOMLINSON 23 
continually implicated in shaping it and being shaped by it. It inhabits the 
collective, kaleidoscopic, and dialogical realm of subjectivities opened out 
to one another. It is nothing like the nineteenth century's transcendental 
Zeitgeist and is distinct even from Annales-school menta lites, because its 
impact is local, fragmented across larger cultural spaces. Various 
postmodern methods have aimed to delimit this metasubjective place of 
cultural formation and to provide a means for describing it: some New 
Historical writings, Hayden White's tropologies, and, again, Foucault's ar-
chaeology / genealogy. 
Third, we might try to see more clearly that categories such as "work" 
"art," "the aesthetic," even "music" itself are not truths given us by the 
world through which we and others must always conceive musical utter-
ances but rather are themselves cultural constructions darkly tinted for us 
with modernist ideology. They are concepts that-in the versions of them 
we habitually and often tacitly deploy-have little currency in the 
historico-geographical world beyond nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
westernism. In questioning them we might begin to carry to the heart of 
our method the limitations of the music-versus-Ianguage epistemological 
model that Kramer identifies as a foundational premise of modernist mu-
sicology. It, too, is no monolithic, given truth, but rather a single point, 
privileged by modern western perceptions, along a spectrum of conceiv-
able relations among music, words, and the world. 
In this endeavor the methods employed by post-Foucauldian histories 
of sexuality and gender might well be revelatory, since such histories have 
worked hard to show the ways in which some of our most basic, apparently 
"natural" categories are local cultural constructs. In this endeavor, also, a 
crucial leverage might come from our exposure to more distant musical 
others than most of us usually encounter. Our difficulty in seeing beyond 
modernism is, after all, in part a result of our concentration on the musi-
cal adumbrations, avatars, and artifacts of modernism. We need to make 
central to our studies not only the most familiar musics we come across 
but also those that seem to us stranger, less tractable. Moreover, we need 
to bring them into our thoughts not by possessing them as newly minted 
canonic objects of study-a common enough strategy in the expansion of 
the observed musical universe that has marked musicology in recent years-
but by leaving them at a distance and coming into contact with them 
through the befogged, ambivalent dialogical medium between them and 
us. We need, in other words, to think hard about what we do as we bring 
cultural others into our line of vision: how can we construct ways of seeing 
them that do not aggressively familiarize (colonize, terrorize) them? 
Ethnomusicology might seem to be the obvious place to look for help 
in this endeavor, except that ethnomusicologists have often defined their 
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project by transferring onto the musics they study precisely the western 
presumptions--of internalism, formalism, aestheticism, transcendentalism-
that we need to question. (It is significant in this regard that Kramer could 
turn to a founder of American ethnomusicology, Charles Seeger, in order 
to exemplify the word/music schism that gave rise to musicological for-
malism and positivism; see page 7.) With some notable exceptions 
ethnomusicologists have been less shaken than we might expect by the 
epistemological revolution that has taken place over the last twenty years 
in their kindred discipline of anthropology. In ethnomusicology as in 
musicology, when it comes to constructing postmodern alternatives the 
enemy seems once more to be us. 
Fourth and finally-and perhaps, indeed, most fundamentally-we might 
begin to interrogate our love for the music we study. This is not to say we 
should try to stop loving it-I would want this no more than Kramer. It is 
instead to urge that we dredge up our usual impassioned musical involve-
ments from the hidden realm of untouchable premise they tend to in-
habit, and that we make them a dynamic force-to be reckoned with, 
challenged, rejected, indulged in, whatever-within our study. The nature 
of our commitment to the works of a Beethoven or a Monteverdi or a 
Brahms cannot be allowed to lie uninvestigated, for then it imposes its 
own hegemony, welcoming musics that move more or less like theirs but 
at the same time foreclosing by invisible action commitments of a similar 
strength to a thousand other, different musics. This hegemony should be 
brought to light, examined in order to enrich and complicate our already 
complex relations with the others we encounter. 
In the process we might shift the focus of musicology away from musi-
cal utterances all told toward the people who make them, away from 
Kramer's mastering dialogue between a work and the musicologist toward 
the less compliant but, I believe, infinitely richer dialogue between people. 
Then the primary stimulus for musicology, instead of our love for this or 
that music, might more luminously be our love of, concern for, commit-
ment to, belief in, alienating distance from-choose your words-the oth-
ers who have made this or that music in the process of making their 
worlds. Then the study of music-making might open out on the study of 
world-making. 
And then-who knows?-we might even find that Beethoven and Mozart 
are not so like ourselves-in their conceivable expressive intents, their 
musical and non-musical desires, their made worlds-as we once thought. 
At bottom Kramer seems to offer a musicology still conceived as a means 
to illuminate our own aesthetic experiences. But this it has been for a 
century now; I am not alone, clearly, in chafing at its constraints. Why not 
try a musicology that aims instead to problematize the knowledge of oth-
ers we come to through their musics? 
Music Criticism and the Postmodernist Turn: 
In Contrary Motion with Gary Tomlinson 
By Lawrence Kramer 
The problem Gary Tomlinson finds with current efforts to frame a 
postmodernist musicology is a version of the Cubbins Conundrum. The 
eponymous hero of Dr. Seuss's classic children's story The Five Hundred 
Hats of Bartholomew Cubbins is in serious trouble. Mter taking off his hat to 
the king, Bartholomew finds himself ordered by the king to-take off his 
hat. But no matter how often he does so, another, identical hat, a be-
draggled old thing with a lame excuse for a feather, keeps appearing on 
his head. So, too, the musicological Bartholomew (me, in this case) may 
try to take off the old hat of modernism with the best of intentions, but no 
better luck. 
Tomlinson spots the Cubbins Conundrum in scholarship that seeks a 
postmodernist end, a "thick contextualism" in the understanding of cul-
tural phenomena, with modernist means. High on the list of such means is 
criticism, glossed as "close reading" and associated with "internalism," "aes-
theticism," "formalism," "transcendentalism," and ''westernism.'' Tomlinson 
claims that criticism trades in concepts, including "[the] work," "art," "the 
aesthetic," and "even 'music' itself," that are "darkly tinted for us with 
modernist ideology" (p. 23). In place of a critical program, he advocates 
what we might loosely call an ethnographic one, aimed proximately at 
"describ[ing] a local set of meanings in as full a volume as possible" (p. 
22), and ultimately at knowing, in nonappropriative, nondominating ways, 
the other people, including our own ancestors, "who have made this or 
that music in the process of making their worlds" (p. 24). 
As Tomlinson acknowledges, he and I share in a desire, fast evolving 
across our discipline, to uncloister music, to understand it as a worldly 
activity. No one caught up by that desire could fail to find something 
appealing in the ethnographic program. But the program as Tomlinson 
formulates it fills me with misgivings. 
First, it depends on a hard-and-fast distinction between criticism and 
ethnography that may be neither necessary, nor desirable, nor even pos-
sible: a programmatic phantom. If so, arguments for either program over 
the other could easily degenerate into sectarian (or worse, careerist) 
squabbles. 
Second, though it might seem hard to quarrel with the ideal of a knowl-
edge free of tendentiousness, scholars do not have the minds of angels; we 
are driven to knowledge by more things than we know. The very claim to 
have such an ideal knowledge might be the surest sign that its absence is 
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still the one thing we can be sure of. Even supposing that knowledge and 
virtue could somehow be reconciled, can we really mistake the prescrip-
tions and proscriptions of any single epistemic program for a panacea that 
will reconcile them? 
Third, even if the break between modernism and postmodernism is 
radical, something I think likely despite Jiirgen Habermas's arguments to 
the contrary,! that does not constitute the postmodern as a moment of 
absolute novelty, a complete rupture with a failed intellectual past. Ironi-
cally, the call for such a rupture is a classically modernist maneuver, epito-
mized by the memorable slogan from Rimbaud's A Season in Hell, "One 
must be absolutely modern" [II faut etre absolument moderne]. I would 
say rather that the post- in postmodernism designates the moment of dis-
engagement from the very idea of such absolutes, and of the consequent 
proliferation of intellectual projects that undo whatJean-Franr,;ois Lyotard 
calls the "grand metanarratives" and Habermas the "unfinished project" of 
modern, which is to say post-Enlightenment, reason.2 
Nonetheless, Tomlinson's critique of criticism cannot merely be written 
off as a caricature, nor his ethnographic program as a blown-up special 
interest. On the contrary, the program reflects the pressing need to find 
the apparent collapse of modernism's cognitive paradigms enabling rather 
than paralyzing. It is important to work out the possibilities and spot the 
difficulties of doing this. Similarly, the critique can be taken to spell out 
exactly what is wrong with one familiar mode of modernist criticism, and 
even exactly what happens when any mode of criticism goes wrong. And 
that makes it important to counter the underlying, far more drastic claim 
that no criticism can ever go right. Perhaps Tomlinson has found the right 
problems but the wrong solutions. Perhaps he has misconstrued the charac-
ter of criticism and its relation to a possible musical ethnography. Perhaps 
he has formulated the ethnographic program itself in terms that will quickly 
prove their own undoing. And perhaps there is no perhaps about it. 
Tomlinson's complaint against criticism is that, in principle, it passes off 
personal response as knowledge and blinds itself to the otherness for 
which it presumes to speak. Criticism inevitably sets a reified object before 
a solipsistic subject. It inflates the authority of both the critic and the artist 
and establishes a spurious transparency of communication between them, 
a relay of (pseudo-)knowledge that also acts as a network of disciplinary 
and social power. The locus of knowledge is the artwork-in this case the 
music-in which criticism corrals too much of our attention. Fetishizing 
the work, criticism withdraws us from the real, scants the weight of history, 
creates a kind of transcendental museum or mausoleum of canonical mas-
terpieces. The locus ~f power is the figure (person and trope) of the 
critic. "Close reading" supposedly proceeds from a discursive position that 
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involves the a priori assumption of coercive authority: the (im)posture of 
mastery, an appropriation by the critic of the composer's voice (s), a falsifi-
cation of knowledge by the denial of the differences between the knower 
and the known. Tomlinson, accordingly, asks us to lay down our scores. 
We must no longer "circle back narrowly to the notes but instead ... 
resolutely historicize musical utterance, exploding it outwards through an imagi-
native building of contexts" (p. 22, italics in original). 
Tomlinson focuses his objections to criticism on my proposal that we 
learn "to read as inscribed within the immediacy-effects of music itself the 
kind of mediating structures usually positioned outside music under the 
rubric of context."3 Arguing that any such effort is doomed by the blind-
ness inherent in criticism, which "tends to deal out from the start the most 
essential and richly problematic historicism of our experiences" (p. 19), 
Tomlinson in effect asks for the reverse, the dispersal into context of what 
we usually grasp as the immediacy of music. What he wants, if we take him 
at his word, is music under erasure: a music so decentered, so bought out 
or bought off by the entrepreneurial historian's "wealthy ... concatena-
tion of past traces" (p. 22) that we can no longer claim to know it, or claim 
it as ours to know. In this dispensation there would be no criticism be-
cause there would be nothing to criticize; the death of criticism would 
follow on the death of what we currently think of as music. For some of us 
that might seem a steep price to pay. 
If Tomlinson's terms of understanding are translated into terms of 
listening, their relentless negativity becomes obvious-and punishing. What 
would happen if we gave up listening with the kind of deep engagement, 
the heightened perception and sense of identification, that both grounds 
and impels criticism? We might avoid a certain amount of ideological 
mystification-assuming, that is, that mere exposure to ideologically 
charged representations renders us helpless against them. (Plato thought 
so, and said we need guardians.) Meanwhile, the materiality of the music, 
the dynamic sensuous fullness that arguably offers a major site of resis-
tance to ideological pressures, would be put at risk. Can we really hear a 
music constituted only by its continual flowing outwards into the conduits 
of world-making? In our unwillingness to fetishize music as an aesthetic 
object, should we rush to dismantle it into a pure concatenation of 
signifiers? In pursuit of a credibly modest ethnographic attitude, should 
we throw the baby out with the bathwater? 
If we can avoid an aesthetic ideology only by swapping musica practica 
for a modern-day musica mundana, if a postmodernist musicology can de-
velop only as a musicology without music, then our situation is pretty 
grim. On the one side, participation mystique, ideological muddle, cock-
sure myths of mastery; on the other, the thickets of thick contextualism, 
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the Pythagorean mysteries of the ethnohistorian supplanting those of the 
ethnocentric close reader. 
Whatever its failings, criticism at least allows more light and air than 
that. Criticism is the public record of our sustained, thoughtful involve-
ment with some of the music we find moving, enlightening, provoking, 
oppressive, ambivalent, and more. Talking about music, old or new, whether 
under the aegis of individuated works, genres, occasions of performance, 
improvisation, or social ritual, is a means of investing that music with the 
very cultural value(s) we also want to comprehend through it. Such talk 
may risk being solipsistic in practice, but in principle, pace Tomlinson, it is 
dialogical. As Mikhail Bakhtin argued tirelessly, 
Any utterance, in addition to its own theme, always responds (in the 
broad sense of the word) in one form or another to others' utter-
ances which precede it. The speaker is not Adam, and therefore the 
subject of his speech itself inevitably becomes the arena where his 
opinions meet those of . . . other viewpoints, world views, trends, 
theories, and so forth. 4 
Ifwe take postmodernism to name an affirmative spirit of diversity, a contest-
able rather than merely a leveling pluralism, then criticism can serve that 
spirit best not by falling silent, but by foregrounding its own inescapably 
dialogical and interdiscursive character. Tomlinson complains that Mozart's 
music is too much with us, but that Mozart, that "mysterious and elusive 
subjectivity," has (been) disappeared. Granted, the music is very much 
with the dwindling "us" who still quixotically harbor a love of "classical" 
music, but is that really because Mozart criticism has continually falsified 
and appropriated the composer's "musical utterance?" Or is it because 
Mozart, through his music, has continually provoked dialogical responses 
that inevitably refigure both "him," each other, and "us?" We may need to 
recognize that much of our Mozart-talk has been too introverted and too 
cozy with an imaginary Mozart, but that is no reason either to dismiss it 
out of hand or, worse yet, to stop talking. 
That brings us to the problem of mastery. There can be no denying 
that criticism has historically promoted a fantasy of instruction in which 
the critic poses as the master of truth. Tomlinson's forceful, eloquent 
warning on this point can be only to the good. Not doing criticism, how-
ever, is hardly enough to free one of the mastery pose. Certainly neither 
Tomlinson in his rhetoric nor his discursive models iI1 theirs are free of it; 
indeed, Michel Foucault, Clifford Geertz, and Hayden White are old hands 
at mastery, real master masters. And while Tomlinson's positive program 
for thickly describing the worldly place of music is not only unobjection-
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able, but exciting, his use of that program to proscribe thickly describing 
the place of worldliness in music is a hegemonic gesture, a gesture of 
mastery, not of distance or reflection. If Tomlinson really wants to avoid 
establishing "new orthodoxies of postmodern musicology" (p. 18)-a goal 
hardly anyone would disavow-he has an odd way of going about it. 
Not that this is Tomlinson's problem directly, any more than the Cubbins 
Conundrum is mine. As he rightly says, we are all in this mess together. 
The problem is that knowledge and power are in it together, too, as 
Foucault above all has insisted: 
Perhaps . . . we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to 
imagine that knowledge can exist only where power relations are 
suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunc-
tions, its demands, and its interests .... We should admit rather that 
power produces knowledge, . . . that there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time 
power relations.5 
Tomlinson is not to be faulted for promoting a certain mode of knowl-
edge, but for imagining that this mode, and this mode only, can transcend 
power relations. Underlying this imaginary episteme is the apparent convic-
tion that power always translates into an abusive or appropriative claim of 
mastery. The conviction is not to be lightly dismissed, given the frequency 
with which power has done just that. But power and mastery are not 
necessarily the same thing; the ability to propose knowledge is not neces-
sarily the ability to impose it. There should be-must be-ways of keeping 
them apart. 
Certainly it is questionable whether the critic's discursive position auto-
matically, in and of itself, reproduces the mastery scenario. And even 
where the scenario occurs, it may include the implicit or explicit acknowl-
edgment of its own fictitiousness. Indeed, one type of postmodernist musi-
cology might be conceived precisely as an attempt to engage musical works, 
genres, and so on dialogically, to write about them either without assum-
ing the pose of mastery or by deliberately assuming it as a rhetorical· 
position, a discursive trope and not a social or institutional force. 
Such an attempt requires a rethinking of what it means to say that the 
critic "speaks for"-that is, has the power to speak for-a composer or a 
musical community. Tomlinson conceives this speaking-for as inherently 
appropriative and ventriloquistic: I speak for myself while pretending to 
speak for the other. But there are other ways to conceive the process, 
other "speech genres" within which to situate the critical discourse. In 
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speaking of a work by, say, Mozart, I may candidly be speaking for him as 
an actor speaks for a character in a classic role. I speak for the other 
precisely in speaking for myself, but always under the possibly resistant 
impress of the other. Or I may be speaking for Mozart the way a narrator 
speaks for a character in a novel: again speaking for the other in speaking 
for the self, but only from a moral or temporal distance that in principle 
limits my claims to certainty and authority. 
Unless I give myself the latitude to speak for the other in some such 
way, I cannot approach the work (genre, etc.) as an "utterance" at all 
except as the passive recipient of messages that mean too much or too 
little. On the one hand I can refer to the most mastery laden concept of 
all, the paternal word, the authoritative voice of the author. On the other, 
following Tomlinson, I can depersonalize the utterance altogether, replac-
ing the author with the "metasubjective level of cultural formation ... 
beyond the reach of individual subjectivities" (p. 22). That would leave me 
with a cultural version of the discredited high-structuralist notion that it is 
language, not the person, which "speaks." Granted, there would be little 
call to dwell "internally" on utterances not genuinely exchanged between 
subjects. Such utterances would need thick description to compensate for 
their wafer thinness. But neutralizing the communicative process does not 
seem very promising as a means of understanding other people in their 
world-making. 
Tomlinson's will to depersonalization pretty clearly reflects the 
decentering of the subject that is so prominent a feature of poststructuralist 
and postmodernist thinking. Even supposing that we can justifY the critic's 
role as dialogical and not ventriloquistic, it is questionable whether we can 
justifY any discursive practice that depends on one unitary, autonomous 
self speaking for another. Criticism, however, does not require such a 
dependency. We have already seen that the critic's voice is invested with a 
certain fictitiousnesS that can, and perhaps should, be made candid. And 
the other for whom the critic speaks may be equally provisional, equally 
embedded in a multiplicity of roles and discourses that no one can hope 
to master. 
For Tomlinson, criticism is simply incapable of these recognitions, as if, 
paralleling the case with music, the mere representation of "individual, 
subjective agency" (p. 22) in critical discourse paralyzed our capacities for 
distance and reflection. Hence Tomlinson would argue that I cannot "close 
read" music, even for its social character, because in doing so I privilege 
both the composer as author(ity) over the sociality of musical utterance, 
and myself as master-a higher author(ity)-over all. We cannot, he ar-
gues, challenge "the modernist myths of ... heroic individualism" (p. 22) 
in a discourse that perpetuates it. But criticism can do more than merely 
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perpetuate the myths of authorship and authority. Precisely because it is 
historically and rhetorically engaged with those myths, it can also destabi-
lize them, undo them, and experiment with alternatives. Criticism can 
interrogate both its own myths and the myths of art. And that is something 
an ethnographic contextualism cannot do by trying to steer around them. 
Suppose we were to rely on Foucault's celebrated demystifying thesis 
that authorship is something produced in and by discourse rather than by 
an individual subject? Authorship, by this account, is a function, not an 
ontological privilege.6 There is nothing here to derail criticism, but plenty 
to redirect it. The person who writes (or composes) may at once perform 
and resist the author-function. And since that function is to personify the 
conjuncture of discourse and society, the "utterances" produced in its 
name will everywhere implicate social practices. In that case, I can assur-
edly make de-authorized social readings of those utterances (say musical 
ones). Indeed, I can read them prolifically, conceiving their sociality as 
extending into culture on the one hand and the psyche on the other. Far 
from privileging me as a master, Tomlinson's "omniscient critic," the pres-
ence of such a readable sociality calls me into dialogue with unmasterable 
realities. 
On reflection, then, the opposition between criticism and ethnography 
proves to be a mirage. Nor is that all. Further reflection will suggest that 
we cannot even carry out the ethnographic program of thickly 
contextualizing musical works, styles, or genres without some understand-
ing of their meaningfulness. The knowledge-claims of a dialogical criti-
cism are prerequisite to those of musical ethnography; if either project 
bans the other, it will suffocate itself. 
For if music is really what Tomlinson calls it, "musical utterance," then 
it must have the speech-act character of utterance.7 It must, that is, be able 
to perform or imitate a social action in the act of being uttered. It must 
further be able to do this in an indefinite number of different circum-
stances, and must accordingly be subject to a semantic variability that 
requires it to be interpreted rather than merely decoded. Only through 
such interpretation, which is to say, through criticism, the putting into 
discourse of the dynamic interplay of speaker, utterance, and reply that 
Tomlinson misleadingly calls internalism, can we make knowledge-claims 
about musical utterance. And if we decline to make those claims in order 
to avoid the supposed pitfalls of criticism, we will forgo the chance to 
recognize the various worldly claims that music makes on us-and makes 
precisely through the pleasure that Tomlinson's version of the ethno-
graphic program, in its anti-aesthetic rigor, elides. 
In sum, we cannot understand music "in context," thick or otherwise, if 
we have no means of representing concretely what the music does as 
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utterance. Unquestionably, there are political and moral problems with 
the aesthetic ideologies that have historically furnished those means, but 
that is no reason to write off the aesthetic, the valorization of perceptual 
pleasure as knowledge, tout court. One possibility for a postmodernist, 
which is to say a worldly, aesthetics, is to trace out the interrelations of 
musical pleasure, musical form, and ideology. Not to pursue that possibil-
ity is tantamount to denying-ascetically if not cognitively, but perhaps 
both-the two cardinal, historically grounded truths that music (or art) is 
meaningful and that music (or art) gives pleasure. 
Tomlinson surely has no wish to make these denials, but his discourse 
leads implacably in their direction. The reason, I think, is the aversion to 
old-fashioned subjectivity that everywhere impels his text, and that over-
laps imperceptibly into a profound distrust of human agency itself. Schooled 
in the postmodernist distrust of unitary selfhood and its delusions, 
Tomlinson's text projects a sense that agency always engrosses too much 
power, that the subject in action always seeks mastery over something or, 
worse, someone, as object. Hence his curious assumption that the best 
means to appreciate someone else's subjectivity is to depreciate one's own. 
Yet if postmodernism has taught us anything, it is that we do not need to 
conceive of subjectivity in such Hegelian terms as a force of opposition, 
inner to outer, private to public, value to fact. We can instead conceive of 
the subject as a position within a continuous process of communicative 
exchange, the character of which is simultaneously psychical, social, and 
cultural. And unless we leave room for this postmodernist subject in the 
discourses of knowledge, we risk falling back into the worst, most auto-
cratic excesses of instrumental reason. 
That is, of course, the last thing Tomlinson wants, but again, his dis-
course has a will of its own. Despite his sophisticated talk about meta-
subjectivity and the plural construction of knowledge, Tomlinson's version 
of musical ethnography is at bottom positivistic. His program appeals to 
discovery procedures and modes of knowledge uncontaminated by "indi-
vidual, subjective agency"; it presupposes an oppositional relationship be-
tween subjectivity, that is, precisely the partial or localized modes of knowl-
edge that an ethnographic postmodernism is supposed to cultivate, and 
truth; and it assumes possession of a transparent-enough metalanguage to 
make good on its epistemic promises.8 There are no clear means by which 
to distinguish this program from what Donna Haraway tartly calls the god-
trick of modern epistemology.9 Underneath the invocation of a "collec-
tive, kaleidoscopic, and dialogical realm of subjectivities opened out to 
one another" (p. 23), I sense, with discomfort, a will to truth that is also a 
will to both intellectual property and purity. Here those metaphors of a 
historicism "essential" in character and "rich" in problematicity, of "wealthy" 
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concatenations set beyond concepts "darkly tinted" by ideology, make a 
haunting return. And from these the program reads its proscriptive bias 
along the ameliorative lines of classic quest romance. 
With this turn of argument, I might seem to have thrown Tomlinson's 
critique back on him in a predictable and somewhat dreary way: You think 
I'm a crypto-modernist? You're another! But the tu quoque game is not the 
point. Rather, the point is discovering the best means to carry out the 
overarching musicological project to which we both want to contribute, 
the understanding of music in its worldliness. From this standpoint the 
problem with Tomlinson's version of the ethnographic program is that its 
distrust of subjectivity sets its conceptual mechanism on self-destruct. The 
knowledge the program seeks is impossible on the terms it sets. 
This is clearest, perhaps, in relation to the problem of otherness. I 
share Tomlinson's desire not to confuse appreciation with appropriation, 
but I am not ready to identify the necessary limitations of anyone person's 
discourse, his included, with an appropriative solipsism. Unlike Tomlinson, 
I am not interested in respecting, not to say reverencing, otherness but in 
deconstructing the opposition of self and other. For that opposition always 
posits a superior self-a master. Tomlinson can judge that a critical read-
ing appropriates the otherness of a Mozart or a Monteverdi or a Leadbelly 
only if he can claim a sure knowledge of that otherness. But since, by his 
own account, he can arrive at such knowledge only from a position exter-
nal to the otherness, the claim to knowledge is both a hermeneutic claim 
and a claim to mastery. Only if Tomlinson could himself be the other 
could he venture a decisive claim to the knowledge he seeks from the 
thick context that surrounds the other. But then, since the rest of us 
remain in a position external to the other, this other Tomlinson would 
not be able to communicate his claim to us. Of course not: being the 
other, he would not be empowered to speak for himself, at least to us, and 
none of us could credibly or transparently speak for him. 
At best, I suppose, one might approximate the knowledge Tomlinson 
seeks by so immersing oneself in the signs of otherness as to identify with 
it, and then to produce a text that would allow a reader to identify with it. 
But the text, being a text, would unavoidably be subject to the slippages 
and metamorphoses of interpretation. And the underlying process of iden-
tification would, just as inevitably, lead both the writer and reader into the 
confusions, alienations, and always questionable jubilances of fantasy, the 
register of the signifying process that Jacques Lacan calls the Imaginary, 
and in which desire, not knowledge, is paramount. 
Criticism, of course, runs just the same risks, a point that underscores 
the continuity of criticism and ethnography but also brings us round to 
the question of conceptual means from a final perspective. How can we 
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write criticism without falling afoul of Tomlinson's critique? From my 
position as a postmodernist critic, the chief value of Tomlinson's argu-
ment is that it forces an explicit answer to that question. 
How, then, can one write criticism as an agent, a subject empowered to 
claim knowledge, rather than as a master, a subject privileged to impose 
knowledge? Or, failing that, how can one write as a literal agent and only a 
figurative master? I offered one answer (only one, an instance, not a 
paradigm) in my reading of Mozart's K 563. In his essay, Tomlinson 
declines to consider the content of this reading. He does so pointedly, of 
course, true to his critique of critical interpretation as such, but nonethe-
less with an indirectness that conceals the problematicity of the gesture. 
And it is indeed odd, if you consult my piece, to speak of internalism, 
aestheticism, or mastery in relation to a critical discourse that makes no 
attempt to account comprehensively for form and structure in K 563 and 
that continually refers musical events not only to each other but also to 
the social construction of the body, to labor, to manners, to heterosexual-
ity and homosociality, to the Rousseauvian concept of civil society, and 
more. This is certainly not close reading in anything like its original liter-
ary sense, which defines the "aesthetic object" as a restricted, semi-sacralized 
field of inquiry and tries to stay wholly within its borders. The critical 
effort is manifestly to grant no more than provisional authority to any 
border, to encourage multiple border crossings, and to efface, in the 
process, the distinctions between inside and outside, work and frame, text 
and context. One might even suppose that I was resolutely historicizing 
the musical utterance, exploding it outwards through an imaginative build-
ing of contexts-except that I wasn't interested in exploding anything. 
Granted, some of the differentness of K 563 will necessarily be lost in 
my discourse. But the loss might have its compensations in insight, and, in 
any case, if I. do not write critically, all of the differentness of K 563 as 
discourse will be lost. There is no musical utterance without an interlocu-
tor; there is no context without a text. Jacques Derrida made this same 
point with the famous dictum that there is no outside the text. But we 
should remember that the dictum is credible only because there is no 
inside the text, either. With luck, each critical effort that puts this recollec-
tion into practice will count as a step toward collapsing the ideal(ology) of 
appropriation, disrupting the trade in authority, mastering the seductions 
of mastery. 
These goals are reachable, if no more than asymtotically, only by writ-
ing onward. In other words, the solution to the Cubbins Conundrum is to 
play it out to the end. When Bartholomew does that, he saves himself, and 
incidentally triumphs over arbitrary authority, by taking off so many hats 
that a metamorphosis happens. Mter 450 doublings, his hats spontane-
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ously begin to blossom; the poor excuse for a phallocratic feather exfoli-
ates into lush ambiguous plumes and gorgeous gems. But Bartholomew, 
good postmodernist that he is, refuses to fetishize his new headwork. He 
produces splendid hats at last, but keeps none of them. 
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Gary Tomlinson responds: 
I resist the many imperatives, the either/or dualisms, the all-or-nothing 
propositions, and the implacable teleologies Kramer folds into my views. 
In the face of so systematic a rigidification of my ideas I will be brief but 
needfully repetitive. 
Kramer writes of my "hard-and-fast distinction between criticism and 
ethnography" (p. 25). I wrote of criticism as a force that "tends to deal out 
from the start the most essential and richly problematic historicism of our 
experiences" (p. 19). Music criticism and music history have in my view 
been countervailing but intersecting tendencies; they admit no absolute 
distinction. 
Kramer would avoid "sectarian (or worse, careerist) squabbles" (p. 25) 
while still somehow-mysteriously, by my lights-taking full cognizance of 
the play of power in discourse. I see criticism as a set of approaches whose 
structures of institutional validation push it in certain methodological di-
rections more forcefully than in others. What Kramer dismisses as sectar-
ian squabbles are, it seems to me, at the center of our differences. Which 
is only to say the obvious: Kramer's choice to pursue "criticism," like mine 
to pursue "history" or "ethnography," carries heavy ideological/institu-
tional/ disciplinary baggage along with it. We might profit by looking deeper 
into the baggage. 
Kramer imputes to me the "drastic claim that no criticism can ever go 
right" (p. 26). Again, I spoke of tendencies, not absolutes: I suggest that 
because of its institutional history criticism tends to pull us away from the 
rich inherent dialogism of all utterance (on which Kramer and I agree; no 
need for poor Bakhtin to sit up nights) in the direction of a narrowed 
dialogue or even solipsism. 
Kramer sees me as depicting, in "classically modernist" fashion, "the 
postmodern as a moment of absolute novelty" (p. 26).1 I spoke instead of 
anything but a sharp break between modernism and postmodernism: of a 
widespread "unease" I sense at "the persistent proximity of our methods to 
those we thought we had moved away from"(p. 18) and of "the contestatory 
and self-problematizing stance of postmodernism ... in the face of 
modernism"(p. 21). I use "postmodern" the way Terry Eagleton uses "post-
Romantic": we are products of modernism "rather than confidently poste-
rior to it."2 
In Kramer's reading I seek "music under erasure" and pursue a relent-
lessly negative "postmodernist musicology ... without music," even "the 
death of what we currently think of as music"(p. 27). This is not the first 
time that challenges to conventional analytic and critical approaches to 
music have been branded anti-aesthetic (read: anti- or unmusical). The 
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knee-jerk response itself says a lot about our inability to disengage our-
selves even a little from, not all "deep engagement"(p. 27) with music, but 
a particular kind of an aesthetic engagement defined and created in eigh-
teenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. The ideology of this engagement 
still weighs too heavily, in my estimation, on the academic study of musics. 
The erasure of music I advocate-that is, musique sous rature in a truly 
deconstructive rather than Kramer's merely destructive guise-might allow 
us to unfold the cultural experiences we gather under the rubric "music" 
as a patchwork of divergences supporting and simultaneously undermin-
ing our presumptions rather than as a monolothic sameness. It might 
begin to expose ways in which our musical languages and our languages 
about music bear within themselves, to speak in Derridean terms, a call for 
their own critique. It might help bring to light deep metaphysical myths on 
which our musical and musicological practices have been based. The dear-
est price musicology can pay is not a decentering of our current notions of 
music-this ought to be its steadfast aim-but the continued sacrifices of 
musical invitations to a broad engagement in human difference. 
The erasure of music I have in mind, by the way, would not militate 
against all close study of scores but only against the preeminence it claims 
in most current varieties of musicological research and pedagogy. I believe 
that dislodging this close study from its position as what I called "the sine 
qua non of musicological practice" would help us to a fuller awareness of 
the premises it usually entails. More generally, I don't wish to "proscribe" 
(Kramer's word, p. 29) any approaches but rather to apply new pressures, 
to scrutinize marginal traces, to look sometimes elsewhere. 
Kramer is apparently troubled by my notions of metasubjective histori-
cal exploration. He devotes a good portion of the midsection of his 
response to the refutation of my putative ''will to depersonalization" (p. 
30), to the "aversion to old-fashioned subjectivity that everywhere impels" 
my text, and .to my "profound distrust of human agency itself' (p. 32), 
suggesting in the process that I adopt "high-structuralist" ideas. Here 
Kramer confuses any notions of metasubjective cultural formation with an 
aggravated Levi-Straussianism that sees nothing but metasubjectivity. The 
confusion is old hat by now; Foucault needed to combat it already in the 
late 1960s. Indeed Foucault's archaeological/genealogical project as it 
evolved around 1970 may be conceived from this perspective as an effort 
to strike a precarious balance of subjective and metasubjective modes of 
cultural formation and analysis in the face of exacerbated structuralist! 
anti-structuralist polarities around him. (In any case, Kramer's rejection of 
metasubjective historical inquiry is ironic in light of the precisely 
metasubjective ''will of its own" he ascribes to my discourse on p. 32.) 
In my own brief discussion of metasubjective research aims I urged that 
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we loose ourselves from models that see culture as the exclusive product of 
conscious and subconscious subjectivity (p. 22). This point is one of four 
suggestions I offered for a revised musicology (pp. 21-24); all the other 
three are intricately implicated in models of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. 
I have never shied away from analyses of human agency in my work. Indeed 
I have argued repeatedly that invocations of the intentional fallacy and 
other interpretive stances that place out of bounds questions of historical 
subjectivity are simplistic, misleading, and limiting. And my recent book 
Music in Renaissance Magic is largely concerned with reconciling certain 
subjective (hermeneutic) and metasubjective (archaeological) analyses. 
Neither have I ever relinquished "the latitude to speak for the other" 
Kramer discusses on page 30. In fact I believe we might well take, as a 
baseline characterization of our interpretive speech-acts, Kramer's formu-
lation that we speak for the other in speaking for ourselves, "but always 
under the possibly resistant impress of the other" (the echo resounds here 
of latter-day hermeneutic formulations like Paul Ricoeur's famous "com-
prehension of the self by the detour of the comprehension ofthe other"). 3 
Except that I'm disturbed by the potential slippage from Kramer's "al-
ways" to his "possibly." The resistance of others in our speech is indelible 
and inevitable, hard-wired into language, so to say. (Wake up, Mikhail!) 
The problem, then, is how to take greater cognizance of this ubiquitous 
resistance, how to carry language's play of differance, of un master able traces, 
to the heart of our historical method as an ongoing critique of our strate-
gies of mastery. My suggestions for revising our musicological project aim-
briefly, generally, and preliminarily, to be sure-in this direction. 
So when Kramer ascribes to me "the ideal of a knowledge free of ten-
dentiousness" (p. 25), when he argues that I ignore my own masterful 
moves or those of Foucault, Geertz, et aI., when he accuses me of advanc-
ing my "ethnographic" mode of understanding as the only one that "can 
transcend power relations" (p. 29), I can only doff, Cubbins-ish, another 
hat in the hope that my head will be more clearly revealed. So let me be as 
clear as I can: My suggestions are all predicated on the idea that we are 
exercizing our powerful and "rancorous will to knowledge" (Nietzsche/ 
Foucault) whenever we speak or teach or set pen to paper or fingers to 
computer keyboard. In this I disagree with Kramer (p. 29): I think the 
subject-positions we find as scholars do automatically "reproduce the mas-
tery scenario," and I do not find Kramer's "speech genres" responsible 
answers to the ethical problems entailed in these masterful claims. I seek 
an ethnographic historicism that, in Foucault's words, "is capable of liber-
ating divergence and marginal elements-the kind of dissociating view 
that is capable of decomposing itself, capable of shattering the unity of 
man's being through which it was thought that he could extend his sover-
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eignty to the events of the past."4 I want a historical method that; instead 
of clamoring ever louder, will undermine and moderate its own voice 
through its clearer (but never full) hearing of others; a method in which 
the subject-position we adopt is not an a priori and little-conscious pre-
sumption subsequently ignored but the conscious, problematized material 
medium we inscribe at every moment of making history. I believe we 
might move toward such a historicism through the specific reorientations 
I suggested in my response to Kramer, among others, and, more gener-
ally, through an intricate construction of webs of historical traces (musical . 
and extramusical) aided by genealogical, dialogical, deconstructive and 
postdeconstructive, feminist, and postcolonial conceptions of culture, knowl-
edge, and power. 
If Kramer's criticism is really an intersubjective practice of "putting into 
discourse ... the dynamic interplay of speaker, utterance, and reply" (p. 
31); if it aims in its historicism and rhetoricality to destabilize our myths 
(p. 31); if its "effort is manifestly to grant no more than provisional au-
thority to any border, to encourage multiple border crossings, and to 
efface, in the process, the distinctions between inside and outside, work 
and frame, text and context" (p. 34); then perhaps I have little substantive 
quarrel with him. 
The trouble is that his practice of criticism, along with the practices of 
many other scholars, seems to me rarely to square with these ideals. It 
does not seem to be destabilizing of itself, rather the reverse. It does not 
sufficiently put its own world in jeopardy, to paraphrase James Clifford, as 
it depicts the worlds of others.5 In this it threatens to efface more than the 
distinctions of work and frame or text and context; it threatens to efface 
the distinction of self and other all told. Kramer writes: "I am not inter-
ested in respecting, not to say reverencing, otherness but in de constructing 
the opposition of self and other" (p. 33). But there is a danger in such an 
approach, the danger that even deconstruction's powerful critique of west-
ern language metaphysics will serve only to bolster or reinstate old pat-
terns of dominance; the danger that, as Romi Bhabha warns, "the place of 
otherness [will be] fixed in the west as a subversion of western metaphys-
ics and ... finally appropriated by the west as its limit-text, anti-west."6 
Postmodern thought at its most challenging, it seems to me, pursues some-
thing else: the extraordinarily complex and problematic maintenance of a 
space for others' escape from our patterns of meaningfulness at the very 
moment in which we, interacting with them, masterfully map out those 
patterns. 
Enough. More than enough. We both, Kramer and I, write books, and 
have published ones recently that, if not the last words on our approaches, 
at least give a clearer sense of their differences in practice than will be had 
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from this exchange. Readers who care to follow these differences might 
well turn to Music as Cultural Practice and Music in Renaissance Magic. Censeat 
lector. 
NOTES 
1 Cf. Andreas Huyssen's warning: "Where pci~trnodernism simply jettisons modernism it 
just yields to the cultural apparatus's demands that it legitimize itself as radically new, and it 
revives the philistine prejudices modernism faced in its own time." "Mapping the Postrnodern," 
in After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versityPress, 1986), 185. 
2 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1983), 18. 
3 Paul Ricoeur, Le conflit des interpretations. Essais d'hermeneutique (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 
1969),20. 
4 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Language, Counter-memory, Practice: 
Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 
153. 
5 James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 2 (1983): 133. 
6 Homi K. Bhabha, 'The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination, and the Discourse 
of Colonialism," in Literature, Politics and Theory: Papers from the Essex Conference 1976--84, ed. 
Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iversen, and Diana Loxley (New York: Methuen, 
1986),151. 
